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Ten years of transition from plan to market - Niels Mygind, CEES, December 2000 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still lacking in the 
process. The barriers for transition are identified. This includes an analysis of the different factors 
behind the steep fall in production in the first years of transition. It is shown that countries 
implementing a tough stabilization and a comprehensive and consequent liberalization have been most 
successful in the process. A fast and comprehensive privatization, on the other hand, has not been 
sufficient for the necessary restructuring of enterprises. Decisive for success in transition has been 
transformation of the state as a crucial part of the development of new market institutions 
implementing well functioning, clear and stable rules of the game for private enterprises. The 
institutional development has been important for the attractiveness of foreign investments and these 
FDI have been important for restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition 
process. 
 
 
1. Introduction - some key questions  
 
The transition in Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union) has been much more difficult 
than expected both by experts and the population. Why has transition been so difficult?  Why did 
production fall steeply in the first years of the transition process? These questions will be answered in 
the following. It will be shown that countries implementing a tough stabilization and a comprehensive 
and consequent liberalization have been most successful in the process. A fast and comprehensive 
privatization, on the other hand, has not been sufficient for the necessary restructuring of enterprises. 
Decisive for success in transition has been transformation of the state as a crucial part of the 
development of new market institutions implementing well functioning, clear and stable rules of the 
game for the private enterprises. Building up the new structure of institutions is still in process in all 
transition economies, but there are huge differences in the stages of development. The frontrunners 
are: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. 
 
The institutional development has been an important factor for the attractiveness of foreign 
investments and these FDI have been important for restructuring enterprises as part of a positive 
circle for the transition process.  
 
This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still lacking in the 
process. First the barriers for transition will be identified. This includes an analysis of the different 
factors behind the steep fall in production in the first years of transition. Then follows a short 
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discussion of the necessary policies of stabilization, liberalization and privatization. The importance of 
a well functioning state will be emphasized and it will be explained how international cooperation and 
FDI have had great impact on the development in some of the frontrunner countries.  
 
 
2. Barriers for transition 
 
The political revolution in 1989-91 the East European countries marked the start of comprehensive 
transformations not only of the economic institutions in the transition from command economies to 
market economies and of a fundamental restructuring of production and the process of production. 
The transition also included the creation and development of new democratic political institutions and 
a cultural liberation with deep changes in habits, norms and values (Mygind, 1994).  
 
The dissolution of the old system, the breaking up of most economic networks between enterprises 
and between countries and steep cuts in production took place in a rather short period. On the other 
hand, building up new links, new products, new production methods demanded huge resources - 
time, capital and human qualifications. Lack of these resources caused bottlenecks for the transition 
process. 
 
Before transition production was determined by direct orders from central planners. In a market 
system it is the demand by the consumers and market based costs, which determine what enterprises 
shall produce. Calculations for the early stage of transition based on world market prices showed 
that around one third of production had a negative value added. In these enterprises the value of 
inputs such as oil and other raw materials were higher than the market value of outputs which could 
only be sold at quite low prices. Labor and capital in these enterprises were not used for production 
but destruction! (Hare and Hughes, 1992). The other two thirds of production were either produced 
with losses or with a very low return on the assets. The transition to world market prices meant that 
much of the huge physical capital stock and much of the human capital build up in the command 
economy turned out to be of very low value measured with the world market as benchmark. 
 
Adjustment to market conditions, therefore, resulted in a drastic fall of production and after a 
somewhat longer period of adjustment also a fall in employment in the old industrial enterprises. 
However, employment was cut much faster in Central Europe compared with CIS-countries where 
the workers stayed in the large failing industrial enterprises although they had cut down most of the 
production. All over Eastern Europe labor productivity fell in the first years of transition. The 
turnaround based on cuts in employment happened earlier in Central Europe compared to the CIS 
countries (EBRD 1999, WB 1996). 
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Table 1 - Growth in GDP 1989-2000 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1999 2000 
           estimate projection (1989=100) 
Albania 9.8 -10.0 -28.0 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -7.0 8.0 7.3 7.0 95 102 
Belarus 8.0 -3.0 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.3 3.4 2.0 80 82 
Bulgaria 0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -10.1 -7.0 3.5 2.4 4.0 67 70 
Croatia -1.6 -7.1 -21.1 -11.7 -8.0 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.5 -0.3 3.5 78 81 
Czech Rep 1.4 -1.2 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 2.2 5.9 4.8 -1.0 -2.2 -0.2 2.0 93 95 
Estonia 8.1 -6.5 -13.6 -14.2 -9.0 -2.0 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.7 -1.1 5.0 76 80 
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.5 6.0 99 105 
Latvia 6.8 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.9 0.1 4.5 60 63 
Lithuania 1.5 -5.0 -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 -4.2 2.2 62 64 
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 4.8 4.1 5.0 122 128 
Romania -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.1 -6.6 -5.4 -3.2 1.5 75 76 
Russia 0.0 -4.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 0.8 -4.6 3.2 6.5 57 61 
Slovak Rep 1.4 -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.1 4.4 1.9 2.0 101 103 
Slovenia -1.8 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 4.9 5.1 109 114 
Ukraine 4.0 -3.4 -11.6 -13.7 -14.2 -23.0 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.7 -0.4 3.0 37 38 
Based on EBRD-2000  
 
The deep strategic restructuring with development of new products, access to new markets and 
introduction of new organizational structures and production methods in the enterprises is a much 
more long term and resource intensive process. It is much easier and faster to cut production and 
employment than to build up new systems that need capital, technological and management expertise 
as well as developed market institutions. Therefore, the result was a steep fall in production followed 
by a rather slow, but in the successful transitional economies, accelerating recovery of production. 
There have been important differences in how fast each transitional country has turned around. 
Poland was the first to show positive growth. In 1996 Poland passed the 1989-production level. 
Slovenia and Slovakia passed the starting point in 1999. The Czech Republic reaches the level 
2000. A weighed average for Central and Eastern Europe including the Baltic Countries shows that 
the 1989 level is passed in 2000 (EBRD 2000). The 2000 production level for Russia is 61% and 
for Ukraine it is only 38% of the 1989 level, see Table 1.  
 
The barriers for the development of the new political system can be found in the risk that the old elite 
converts its political power to new forms in the new system, and in the lack of democratic traditions 
and experience. An important barrier is the overwhelming burden of consolidation of the democratic 
institutions in a period where new legislation is needed in almost all areas. Many political decisions 
must be made without knowing the effects of the policies because of the high uncertainty in the early 
years of transition. It is impossible to implement the full market model in one step. In most areas a 
long transitional period will be dominated by “half solutions” leaving a lot of holes to be exploited by 
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corrupt elements inside and in relation to the administrative system. The uncertainty in the political 
system is an important reason why it has taken several years to develop stable political parties, 
simply because it is difficult to develop and implement stable political programs in a very unstable 
period. 
 
The barriers for the cultural transition can be divided in two main types. The dissolution of the rigid 
Soviet system meant that the deep cultural values, that had been suppressed now flourished again. 
Religion and national conscience regained importance in many countries. Many of the conflicts frozen 
down in the Soviet system were unfrozen, and in some areas conflicts heated up further and 
exploded in ethnic religious wars. Such conflicts seriously delayed the transition process in Caucasus 
and in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Norms and routines from the command economies have prevailed for many groups. Especially the 
older generations have problems understanding and following the wave of drastic changes. On the 
other hand the transition gives a lot of opportunities, especially for young people. Therefore, the gap 
between generations has deepened in many countries of transition. Especially in the CIS-countries 
without a collective consciousness about the time before the command economy, there is strong 
inertia concerning the change of norms and habits. This is a main barrier for the development of the 
new market economy. 
 
Ideally, the transition of economic institutions should be made in one step. With the exception of 
GDR, which was taken over by BRD and in a very short time enrolled in the German institutional 
system, it is not possible to implement a real “big bang”. Even in countries performing a tough 
economic chock therapy like Poland and Estonia there is still a way to go in building up and 
implementing all the necessary market institutions.  
 
The key elements in a market economy are: market-based prices as information signals and private 
ownership with decentralized control and decentralized incentives for the owners. There must be 
direct correspondence between the right to control and the financial rights to returns and capital 
gains. The implementation of these elements is done through stabilization, liberalization and 
privatization - to be analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
3. The necessity of stabilization  
 
In all the command economies there was a “monetary overhang” because of constant prices 
combined with unbalanced expansion of purchasing power. This overhang was reflected in excess 
demand or under supply of goods. Queues and empty shops were not signs of too low production 
and consumption. They were signs of too low prices in relation to purchasing power. To implement 
the market mechanism the prices were liberalized in the start of transition.  In countries with a huge 
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monetary overhang like in the former Soviet Union the result was an explosion in prices. Hungary, 
which already had market oriented prices in the 1980s saw only a small increase in prices in 1990, 
see Table 2, while price liberalization in Russia in January 1992 resulted in a 300% jump in prices 
just for one month.   
 
 
Table 2 - Inflation 1990-2000  (consumer prices, year-end to year-end) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
          estimate projection 
Albania   237 30.9 15.8 6.0 17.4 42.1 8.7 -1.0 1.7 
Belarus  93.0 1559 1996 1960 244 39.3 63.4 182 251 106 
Bulgaria 72.5 339 79.2 63.9 122 32.9 311 579 1.0 6.2 5.0 
Croatia  136 250 938 1149 -3.0 3.8 3.4 5.4 4.4 8.0 
Czech Rep 9.6 56.6 12.7 18.2 9.7 7.9 8.6 10.0 6.8 2.5 4.1 
Estonia 79.0 304 954 35.6 41.7 28.9 14.8 12.5 4.2 3.8 4.5 
Hungary 33.4 32.2 21.6 21.1 21.2 28.3 19.8 18.4 10.3 11.2 9.2 
Latvia  262 959 34.9 26.3 23.1 13.1 7.0 2.8 3.2 2.3 
Lithuania  345 1161 189 45.0 35.7 13.1 8.4 2.4 0.3 1.3 
Poland    37.6 29.5 21.6 18.5 13.2 8.6 9.8 8.2 
Romania 37.7 223 199 296 61.7 27.8 56.9 151 40.6 54.8 40.0 
Russia  161 2506 840 204 129 21.8 10.9 84.5 36.8 19.7 
Slovak Rep 18.4 58.3 9.1 25.1 11.7 7.2 5.4 6.4 5.6 14.2 8.0 
Slovenia 105 247 92.9 22.8 19.5 8.9 9.0 8.9 6.5 8.0 7.8 
Ukraine  161 2730 10155 401 182 39.7 10.1 20.0 19.2 24.0 
Based on EBRD-2000  
 
High and persistent inflation means that the price system sends uncertain signals. The functioning of 
the decentralized information system and thus the market mechanism is hampered. This is the reason 
why stabilization of prices is important. In countries such as Russia and Ukraine too lax economic 
policy resulted in a spiral of price increases combined with increasing nominal wages, continued 
depreciation of the currency, expansion of the monetary supply and soft credits to enterprises. The 
high inflation continued for several years. The Central European countries, on the contrary, 
implemented quite a tough stabilization policy. This also happened a few years later in the Baltic 
countries. From table 2 it can be seen that the inflation in these countries fell under the critical level of 
40-50% by 1994. At this time inflation was still very high in Bulgaria, Romania and the CIS 
countries. However, through tightening of monetary policy and currency policy with a rather stable 
exchange rate Russia and most other CIS countries succeeded in stabilizing inflation from 1995. The 
currency crisis in Russia in August 1998 gave another push to inflation, but a tough stabilization 
policy has again resulted in inflation levels, which do not seriously hamper the functioning of the 
market mechanism.  
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With the Russian crisis there was a backlash in demand which limited growth and also inflation in 
most transitional economies in 1998 and 1999. Now, inflation is on a quite low level in Central- and 
Eastern Europe. With relatively fixed exchange rates and an increase in productivity that leaves room 
for a real appreciation: the inflation can be a little higher than inflation for the most important trading 
partner, EU. 
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 there is a clear connection between lower inflation and growth in 
production. Countries with fast and consequent stabilization and controlled inflation had, after a few 
years, growth in production while the fall in production continued for several years in the CIS 
countries with postponed stabilization. 
 
 
4. The necessity of liberalization - status for implementation 
 
Liberalization, that is deregulation of the state through transfer of control and incentives to 
decentralized units, is an important element of developing the market mechanism. Successful 
liberalization also means stable and clear rules of the game for private enterprises and institutions 
monitoring competition and securing a level playing field. Liberalization of prices (except for specific 
areas such as energy, public transport and housing) was implemented rather fast in most countries. 
At the same time the frontrunners implemented a fast and comprehensive liberalization of foreign 
trade.  
 
The opportunity for establishing new private enterprises is also an important part of the market 
economy. However, it is not only important to create access to entry. It is also important to 
implement the possibility and clear rules for exit from the market. Therefore, a well functioning legal 
framework for bankruptcy is important. Exit means that non-performing assets are taken over by 
new owners, who will have the opportunity to make better use of the assets. It means that the 
market is taken over by competing enterprises. If exits are blocked by soft credits and subsidies 
inefficient state supported enterprises can block the entrance of new and potentially more efficient 
enterprises.  
 
Contrary to price-liberalization, which was implemented rather fast and consequent in most 
countries, opening up for foreign competition showed more variation. Even larger differences could 
be found in the implementation of bankruptcy procedures. Countries such as Estonia and Hungary 
have implemented tough procedures while countries such as the Czech Republic and Russia have 
been more hesitant in the implementation of hard budgets for their enterprises. 
 
There is a strong connection between this part of liberalization and the development of market 
institutions related to the financial system, banks and the capital market, and to the development of 
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institutions securing private property rights. This part of the liberalization process has also been 
implemented with high variation in speed and consequence in the different transitional countries: 
 
Table 3   Status for liberalization based on the EBRD-Transition Report 2000 
 Price 
liberalization 
Liberalization 
of foreign 
trade and   
exchange 
Competition 
policy 
Bank reform 
liberalizatio
n of  
interest rate 
Securities 
market and 
non-bank 
financial 
inst 
Bankruptcy 
legislation 
(EBRD 99) 
Commercial 
law 
Albania   3 .    4+ 2 - 2+ 2 - 1 . 2+ 
Belarus 2 - 2 - 2 . 1 . 2 . 2 . 1+ 
Bulgaria 3 . 4+ 2+ 3 . 2 . 4 - 4 - 
Croatia 3 . 4+ 2+ 3+ 2+ 4 - 4 -  
Czech Rep 3 . 4+ 3 . 3+ 3 . 3+ 3+ 
Estonia 3 . 4+ 3 - 4 - 3 . 4 - 4 - 
Georgia 3+ 4+ 2 . 2+ 2 - 2 - 2 . 
Hungary 3+ 4+ 3 . 4 . 4 - 4 - 4 - 
Latvia 3 . 4+ 2+ 3 . 2+ 3+ 4 - 
Lithuania 3 . 4 . 3 - 3 . 3 . 3 . 4 - 
Poland 3+ 4+ 3 . 3+ 4 - 3+ 4 - 
Romania 3 . 4 . 2+ 3 - 2 . 3 . 4 - 
Russia 3 . 2+ 2+ 2 - 2 - 3 - 3+ 
Slovak Rep 3 . 4+ 3 . 3 . 2+ 3 . 3 . 
Slovenia 3+ 4+ 3 - 3+ 3 - 4 . 4 - 
Ukraine 3 . 3 . 2+ 2 . 2 . 2 . 3 . 
based on EBRD-2000, index  from 1 (no liberalization) to 4+ (full liberalization) 
 
 
5. Privatization and corporate governance 
 
Privatization of enterprises is necessary for developing decentralized control and decentralized 
incentives such as financial ownership rights. The owners and managers need incentives to use the 
resources efficiently. This is closely connected to the development of efficient corporate governance 
systems between owners, managers and other stakeholders connected to the activities of the 
enterprises. 
 
However, it is difficult to implement privatization in transitional economies because many market 
institutions are not fully developed - a developed banking system, a well functioning stock market, 
reliable information about the economic situation of enterprises etc. It is very difficult to give a fair 
valuation of the assets because the markets are only in a rather low developed stage with very high 
uncertainty about the future development. The population lacks information and lacks capital to buy 
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the assets. The solution to the last problem has in countries like the Czech Republic, Russia and 
Lithuania been privatization through vouchers - privatization coupons freely distributed to the 
population. These vouchers can be used for auctions of the enterprises to be privatized. Investment 
funds often play an important role in this process. The problem with lack of capital is solved, and it is 
possible to have a high degree of equality in the distribution of the assets.  
 
Table 4   Status for privatization 2000 (EBRD), method for large privatization  
 
 Private 
sector 
% of GDP 
Large 
privatization 
(large 
enterprises) 
Small 
privatization 
(small 
enterprises) 
Governance 
And 
Enterprise 
Restructurin
g 
Primary 
privatization 
method 
Secondary  
privatization  
method 
Peak 
privatization 
years 
 
Albania 75 2 . 4 . 2 . insider voucher 1995-96 
Belarus 20 1 . 2 . 1 . not privatized   
Bulgaria 70 4 - 4 - 2+ direct sale voucher 1997 
Croatia 60 3 . 4+ 3 - insider voucher 1995 
Czech Rep 80 4 . 4+ 3+ voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Estonia 75 4 . 4+ 3 . direct sale voucher 1994-95 
Hungary 80 4 . 4+ 3+ direct sale insider 1992-96 
Latvia 65 3 . 4+ 3 - direct sale voucher 1996-97 
Lithuania 70 3 . 4+ 3 - insider/voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Poland 65 3+ 4+ 3 . insider/voucher direct sale 1997 
Romania 60 3 . 4 - 2 . insider direct sale 1995 
Russia 70 3+ 4 . 2 . insider/voucher direct sale 1993-94 
Slovak Rep 75 4 . 4+ 3 . direct sale voucher 1992-96 
Slovenia 55 3 . 4+ 3 - insider voucher 1995-96 
Ukraine 55 3 - 3+ 2 . insider direct sale 1998-99 
Based on EBRD-1999/2000, privatization index: 1=no privatization, 4+=full privatization, method:own estimate 
 
In other countries such as Estonia and Hungary the most important method of privatization has been 
direct sale to the investor who could offer the best combination of price, and guarantees of future 
investment and employment. Direct sale favors capital owners, and especially foreign investors have 
played an important role in countries using this method of privatization. In other countries such as 
Russia, Lithuania and Slovenia insiders, managers and the group of other employees, had strong 
advantages for taking over their enterprises including large and medium sized enterprises. In other 
countries such insider takeovers have been frequent for small privatization - privatization of small 
enterprises and sub-units of larger enterprises. 
 
A fast and comprehensive privatization is not sufficient for developing a system of efficient corporate 
governance. Also a well functioning state is necessary (see next section) and it is necessary to have 
well functioning institutions for securing property rights, a developed capital market, access to 
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reliable information about enterprises for existing and potential investors, and well functioning 
bankruptcy procedures. There are many examples of fast and comprehensive privatization, which 
did not lead to efficient corporate governance:  
 
The main part of the large privatization in the Czech Republic was done through vouchers in the 
period 1992-94. After the privatization rounds most of the assets were controlled by investment 
funds controlled by the large banks. However, state ownership dominated most of these banks. 
Therefore, it could be questioned whether the assets were truly privatized. The main problem, 
however, was that the administrators of the investment funds had the de facto control with the 
enterprises in their portfolio. The real owners who had invested their vouchers in the investment 
funds were outside influence. This gap between control on one side and the financial returns on the 
other gave the administrators the opportunity to exploit their control and tunnel values out of the 
enterprises to the benefit of other enterprises directly owned by them. Similar ways of inefficient 
corporate governance systems resulting in tunneling are also known from Russia and other 
economies in transition.  
 
 
6. The importance of a well functioning state 
 
Closely connected to the quality of corporate governance of the enterprises is the quality of the 
governance of the state. Clear and stable rules of the game are a must for a well functioning market 
economy. Here we can distinguish between the development of the political dimension - the 
development of democratic institutions - and the administrative dimension - the quality of the state 
bureaucracy. The two dimensions support each other and there is a close connection between the 
development of democratic institutions and the progress in economic reforms. Figure 1 shows the 
relation between the development of democracy as measured by Freedom House on a scale from 1 
(developed democracy) to 7 (dictatorship) and an average of EBRD’s reform indicators from 4.3 
(fully developed reforms) to 1 (no reforms). The numbers are based on 1999 data. 
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Figure 1. The relation between democracy and economic reforms
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It is worth noting that a well functioning state is not the same as a strong state with the head of state 
in power for a long period. Stability of power is not a guarantee for a positive development. If the 
strong state means lack of democratic institutions and lack of political competition - limited possibility 
for the opposition to criticize and challenge the current head of state. It is important that the 
government and the administration can be criticized and corrected. The old Soviet system was an 
example of a stable, but petrified state power, that lacked correction mechanisms and was not able 
to make the necessary flexible adjustments to exploit the opportunities of the technological 
development. 
 
A strong opposition performing a persistent and strong monitoring of both the political elite and of 
the administrative bureaucracy can unveil inefficiencies, corruption and abuse of power. The free 
press has an important role, but is it also important to have a well functioning legislative system with 
clear rules and consequent and fair implementation through an efficient and independent court 
system. Some of the Central European countries probably have an advantage in this respect because 
of the roots back to a well functioning court system before World War 2. 
 
The EU-integration process supports a further development and check of the quality of the 
democratic institutions and especially of the administrative capacity of the state. This is another 
explanation why the best functioning transitional states are found among the applicants for EU 
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membership. In the accession process the applicants have to strengthen state functions such as a 
transparent and fairly implemented tax system, efficient and fair regulation of enterprises in relation to 
environment and safety at the workplace. 
 
 
7. Restructuring of enterprises 
 
One of the most important problems of the command economy was the insufficient use of the human 
and technological resources to develop and produce competitive products. The main reason behind 
the steep fall in production at the beginning of transition was, as earlier mentioned, the gap between 
the production structure of the command economy and the new structure adjusted to the competitive 
market economy. This transition of production is directly linked to the restructuring of enterprises. 
The defensive restructuring, cutting away unprofitable production and cutting down the number of 
employees, was implemented in the first years of transition although it was implemented slower and 
less consequently in the CIS countries.  
 
Deep strategic restructuring means building up the new structure of production with development 
of new products, new production methods, new technology, retraining of the employees, 
implementation of new management methods, new structures of organization, new networks to 
suppliers, new marketing methods and new markets. Strategic restructuring takes a long time and 
needs large capital inputs. At the same time new management skills must be developed - training of 
old and new managers in strategy, accounting, marketing, organizational behavior etc. is a persistent 
bottleneck in all countries in transition. 
 
Strategic restructuring is not only taking place in existing enterprises. Starting up new enterprises is a 
very important element in building up the new structure of production. This is especially important for 
sectors like trade and services, which had a low priority under the command economy. Closing 
down and/or breaking up old giant industrial enterprises and transfer of employees and physical 
assets to new enterprises is often the most efficient form of deep restructuring. The success of the 
Polish economy is closely connected to the very dynamic development of new small and medium 
sized enterprises. The Polish privatization was rather slow, but new private enterprises contributed to 
a fast growth in the private sector from the early start of the transition process. 
 
Bureaucratic barriers, lack of transparency in legislation, uncertainty in relation to more or less 
criminal networks, and uncertainty about the market development in general have limited the 
possibilities and the dynamic development for small and medium sized enterprises in most CIS 
countries.  
 
The societal framework including the quality of the state is a very important factor for strategic 
restructuring. At the same time corporate governance of enterprises plays a crucial role. It is 
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important which groups take over the ownership of the enterprises in the privatization process and in 
the post privatization change of ownership structures. The privatization and lack of regulation of 
investment funds in the Czech Republic is an example of a bad corporate governance system, which 
did not develop incentives for strategic restructuring. 
 
The Russian privatization has been criticized for the strong emphasis on insider-takeovers by 
management and broad groups of the other employees. Experts have called this: “half privatization” 
and some evidence have been presented showing that insider owned enterprises have problems 
getting enough capital for restructuring. However, there are contradictory evidence showing that 
insider owned companies often perform better that outsider owned domestic enterprises (Mygind 
2000). The delay in restructuring in Russian enterprises will probably not be explained by the 
ownership structure. Instead, the unfavorable conditions in the institutional framework around the 
enterprises must be blamed. One of the leading economies in transition, Slovenia, with the highest 
GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, has a corporate governance system mainly based on employee 
owned enterprises. 
 
Note, however, that there is quite clear evidence that enterprises owned by foreign core investors 
are in front concerning strategic restructuring. This will be further discussed in the following section. 
 
 
8. Foreign Direct Investment - importance and development  
 
The explanation behind the strong strategic restructuring in foreign owned enterprises shall be found 
in the fact that foreign investors have strong advantages concerning access to capital, management 
expertise, new technology and international networks. Usually the foreign investor constitutes a 
strong core owner with a dominant share of ownership. This means that there are no corporate 
governance problems under the assumption that the overall institutional framework guarantees the 
property rights. Those countries with the highest foreign direct investment per capita are 
characterized by an advanced process of transition and a quite well functioning state with clear and 
transparent rules for enterprises and for foreign investors. Hungary is clearly in the lead measured per 
capita. Already in the 1980es Hungary had opened up for foreign investments mostly in the form of 
joint ventures. The high level of foreign investments has been an important reason behind Hungary’s 
advanced development in relation to strategic restructuring and in relation to the development of a 
competitive industry. However, some evidence points in the direction that the spin-offs to the 
domestic part of the industry are rather modest  (Hunya 1997). 
 
Foreign investments are often motivated by access to the market of the host country. However, there 
are increasing motivations based on the exploitation of competitive factor inputs, especially the cheap 
highly qualified labor force (Meyer, 1998). Often the two motives are combined. The host country is 
an important market and at the same time the foreign investor uses the factors of production to build 
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up exports to other Eastern European countries or to export back to Western industrialized 
countries. Furthermore, there is a clear connection between opening of foreign trade and the increase 
in foreign investments. 
 
Table 5 - Foreign investments per year, and accumulated 1989-99  
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
projection 
1989-99 
accumulated 
       
mill USD 
       USD 
per 
capita 
Albania    20 45 65 89 97  42  45  51  92 454 137 
Belarus     18 11 15 73 198 142 225 100 681 67 
Bulgaria  4 56 42 40 105 98 138 507 537 806 500 2332 284 
Croatia    13 78 106 96 509 302 781 1350 450 3234 716 
Czech Rep    983 563 749 2526 1276 1275 2641 4912 6000 14924 1447 
Estonia     156 212 199 111 130 574 233 250 1615 1122 
Georgia     0 8 6 54 236 221 96 109 622 116 
Hungary 187 311 1459 1471 2328 1097 4410 1987 1653 1453 1414 1650 17770 1764 
Latvia     50 279 245 379 515 303 331 300 2100 866 
Lithuania     30 31 72 152 328 921 478 295 2012 545 
Poland  0 117 284 580 542 1134 2741 3041 4966 6642 10000 20047 518 
Romania  -18 37 73 87 341 417 415 1267 2079 949 500 5647 252 
Russia      500 1663 1665 4036 1734 746 2000 10344 71 
Slovak Rep 10 24 82 100 107 236 194 199 84 374 701 1500 2111 391 
Slovenia -14 -2 -41 113 111 131 183 188 340 250 144 50 1400 701 
Ukraine      151 257 526 581 747 489 750 2751 55 
Based on EBRD 2000  
 
9. Status after 10 years and perspectives for the remaining transition process 
 
Has the transition been too tough? Recognizing the drastic fall in production and living standards the 
first answer must be yes. However, there is a lot of variation in the development of production for 
different countries. The evidence shows that the most consequent reformers have been most 
successful. The majority of the population in these countries now have living conditions at least as 
good as before the transition started. This level has been reached after ten years of tough 
transformation with high costs for many groups such as retired people, most employees in the public 
sector, workers in large failing enterprises etc. Many mistakes have been made in the process and 
many countries still are well below the starting point. 
 
Reforms must be adjusted to the specific conditions in each country. But this argument is often used 
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as an excuse for slow and inconsistent reforms. It is hardly too tough policies, but hesitant and 
contradictory reforms combined with a badly functioning state, which is to blame for the lacking, or 
hopefully postponed, success in several countries. 
 
There is a close connection between the success of the reforms, the quality of the state and foreign 
investments and opening toward the developed market in Western Europe. The countries most 
advanced in the transition process are also the countries most advanced in the integration process 
with EU and they also have the highest level of foreign investments.  Foreign direct investment plays 
an important role in the current stage of transition with focus on restructuring at the enterprise level. 
 
These elements points toward the transition of the coming years with further integration with Western 
Europe and further restructuring of enterprises and integration into international networks of 
production. There is still some way left in the restructuring of production even in the most advanced 
transitional countries. Even though these countries have an educational level comparable to most EU 
countries they need to invest a lot of capital in a new restructured production base. The qualifications 
of the labor force must be adjusted to the new needs. Further development of most institutions is 
crucial especially concerning the financial markets, the court system and the development of the 
administrative capacity of the state. 
 
I the next ten years we will probably see an extension of the gap in Eastern Europe with groups of 
countries at different speeds in relation to transition and to EU-integration. In the frontline we have 
Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary closely followed by Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovakia and probably soon also Croatia, while Bulgaria and Romania together with the 
remaining countries in the Balkan come in the second row. 
 
The CIS countries with Russia in front have a more uncertain future and a more peripheral 
participation in integration process. Decisive for the development in Russia and the other CIS 
countries will be the development of the state. Will they succeed in building up a well functioning 
democracy with a critical opposition and an independent free press, which can criticize the people in 
power and present alternatives to corruption and abuse of power? Will they succeed in building up 
an administrative capacity, which can assure clear, stable and fair rules for enterprises?  
 
The West has great influence on this development. This concerns a positive attitude to the EU-
integration process and a continued development in the economic cooperation. It also concerns the 
relation to the CIS countries where a development of the cooperation including support for the 
development of the capabilities of the state must be in the focus to keep the transition process on the 
right track.  
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